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THE MORSyAN TRUST

TRUSTOR AS SOLE TRUSTEE
AND ONLY ASCERTAINABLE BENEFICIARY*
William F. Fratcher*"
Morsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue' involved a declaration of trust of corporate stock made by a bachelor without issue
who was not contemplating marriage. In the declaration the settlor
declared himself trustee to accumulate the income for five years and
add it to the principal, to pay the income subsequently accruing to
himself during the remainder of his natural life and, in the event the
settlor should die leaving issue, to divide the income annually among
such issue, children of a deceased child to take the share such deceased
child would have taken had such child not died. The instrument provided that if the settlor died without issue surviving him the trust
should then terminate, but that if he should die leaving issue surviving,
the trust should terminate twenty years after his death. Upon termination, the trust estate was to be divided among the issue of the settlor,
children of a deceased child to take the share of the parent, but if no
issue of the settlor should survive the termination of the trust, the trust
estate should be turned over to the surviving widow of the settlor, and
if neither issue nor widow of the settlor survived the termination, the
trust estate should be distributed among the heirs of the settlor, to be
ascertained according to the laws of the State of Nebraska, where the
instrument was executed. 2
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, one judge
dissenting, affirmed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals3 holding
that a profit arising from sale of the stock was txable to the settlor
individually because the declaration did not create a trust. The major* The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor Lewis M. Simes of the
University of Michigan Law Faculty for his kindness in reading the manuscript and suggesting clarifying changes. Professor Simes is not responsible for the accuracy of the research
or for the views expressed herein.
** Associate Professor of Law, Professor of Law elect, University of Missouri-Ed.
1 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 18; cert. den., 302 U.S. 701 (1937); 38 COL. L. Rav.
195 (1938);51 HAv. L. REv. 176 (1937); 22 MixN. L. REv. 445 (1938); 17 NEB. L. BUL.
242 (1938); 16 Tx. L. RPv. 270 (1938); 24 VA. L. Rxv.83 (1937).
2 Nebraska has adopted the common law of England and applies the English equity rules
governing trusts. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-101 (1943); St. James Orphan Asylum v. Shelby, 60
Neb. 796, 84 N.W. 273 (1900).
a Morsman v. Comm.. 33 B. T. A. 800 (1935).
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ity opinion argued that, although a trust may be created solely for the
benefit of unborn or unascertained beneficiaries by a transfer to a
third party as trustee, it cannot be done by a declaration of trust. The
opinion suggested that a transfer in trust for unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries creates only a resulting'trust for the settlor until the beneficiaries come into being or are ascertained. This being so, a declaration of trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries creates only a
.resulting trust for the settlor-trustee. Thus he has legal title and the
whole equitable title, which merge. Moreover, said the opinion, a
trust cannot exist without someone in being entitled to enforce it. The
opinion added that, in any event, a person cannot make an effective
transfer to his own right heirs.

HIsTOmcAL ASPECTS

The English man of property who attempted to create indestructible
interests in unborn or unascertained persons met with judicial opposition throughout the mediaeval period. Feudal tenures were important
under the Norman and Angevin dynasties, and the royal judges were
well aware that the revenues of the crown arose in large part from reliefs, wardships, marriages, escheats and forfeitures, which enured to
the crown only when a tenant of land died or was attainted while seised
of an estate of inheritance. If a landowner could create interests in
unborn generations by ptfrchase, these lucrative feudal dues would be
cut off to that extent.4 Under the Tudor and Stuart dynasties feudal
dues had ceased to be important, but the royal judges were still hostile
to the creation of indestructible interests in the unborn because of their
tendency to restrict alienability and discourage development of land.5
Perhaps the earliest attempt to create indestructible interests in the
unborn or unascertained was by means of the fee simple conditional,
a gift to a living donee and the heirs of his body. The attempt was
defeated by judicial decision that the donee could convey in fee simple
after issue was born to him.6 The great landholders succeeded in get4 1 Fn ,NE, CoNTrrENET REMAINDrES 83-89, 10th ed., (1844).

5 Opinion of Blackstone, J. in Perrin v. Blake, 1 Black. W. 672, 96 Eng. Rep. 392

(1772), printed at length in HARGRAVE, COLLECTION
ENGLAND
490, 500 (1787).
6

'or
TieArs RELATIVE To THE LAW or

Brian v. London, Y. B. 32-3 Edw. 1, 279 (1304); 1 CorE, INsrrruTs 19a, Ist Amer.
ed., (1853).
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ting this judicial ruling reversed by statute in 1285' so that gifts of
this type created an estate in fee tail, the tenant of which could not at
first destroy the interests of the heirs of his body. Within two hundred
years the judges nullified the statute by deciding that the tenant in tail
could destroy the interests of both the heirs of his body and the reversioner or remainderman by suffering a common recovery, which was a
fictitious suit brought by one who feigned to have a title superior to
that of the tenant in tail.8
The simple expedient of a direct conveyance of a future interest
to an unborn donee was impossible at common law because an estate
for life or in fee could not be made to commence in the future.9 So,
as Andrew Baker could not convey his land to John Stiles effective
after ten years or upon the death of Andrew, he could not convey his
land to the unborn son of John Stiles effective upon the birth of the
son. The only possibility was to convey a "particular" estate for life or
in tail to a living person, with remainder to an unborn person to take
effect in possession upon the termination of the particular estate. The
ways in which a contingent remainder in an unborn person could be
created were narrowly limited by a number of arbitrary rules developed
by the common law courts. A remainder could not be given to an
unborn person by name, that is, Andrew Baker could not convey to
John Stiles for life, remainder to Matthew, son of John Stiles, if John
had no son named Matthew at the time of the conveyance, even though
a son named Matthew should subsequently be born.'0 A remainder
could not be given to the unborn child of an unborn person.'1 A remainder could not be given to the right heirs of the donor, that is, John
Stiles could not convey to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to the right
7 Stat.

Westminster 2, alias De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285); see I

CoxE, IzsTrtrrEs 18b-19b, Ist Amer. ed., (1853); 2 BLAcKSTONo,

COMMENTAIUES

112,

Cooley's 2d ed., (1872).
8
Taltarum's Case, Y. B. 12 Edw. 4, Mich. pl. 25 (1472). After 1490 the heirs of the
body of the tenant in tail, but not the reversioner or remainderman, could be barred by another type of collusive judicial proceeding, known as a fine. 4 Hen. 7, c. 24 (1488); 32 Hen.
8, c. 36 (1540).
9 Hoggv. Cross, Cro. Eliz. 254, 78 Eng. Rep. 510 (1591); Barwick's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b,
77 Eng. Rep. 199 (1598).
lo Anonymous, Y. B. 10 Edw. 3, 45a (1336); see Sir Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co. Rep.
50a, 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527, 530 (1597).
11Whitby v. Mitchell, L.R. 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890); 1 FEARNE, COrMNGENT REmAINDERS 251, 565 (Butler's note), 10th ed., (1844); see Sir Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co.
Rep. 50a, 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527, 530 (1597). This is known variously as the old rule
against perpetuities, the rule against double possibilities and the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell.
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heirs of John.' 2 A remainder could not be given to the right heirs of a
person who took a prior life estate under the conveyance, that is,
Andrew Baker could not convey to John Stiles for life, remainder to
the right heirs of John; such a conveyance would give John Stiles the
whole fee. 13 There seems to have been an ancient rule that no one
14
who was not the right heir could take under the designation "heirs.'
A conveyance to a living donee who had no issue and to his children
or issue created an estate tail in the living donee and did not create an
interest by way of remainder in his unborn issue in the absence of a clear
expression of intention to the contrary."5
If a conveyancer succeeded in avoiding all the restrictive rules of
law and interpretation, he could create an interest by way of contingent
remainder in an unborn or unascertained person. But a contingent remainder was wholly destroyed unless it vested at or before the time when
the particular estate terminated. In the case of a remainder to an unborn person, that person had to be alive and ascertainable at the termination of the particular estate. So if Andrew Baker conveyed to Lucy
Baker for life, remainder to the heirs of John Stiles, and Lucy died
before John, the contingent remainder to the heirs of John would be
destroyed, because a man's heirs are not ascertainable during his lifetime. 6 Moreover, a contingent remainder was destroyed if the particular estate was destroyed or prematurely terminated before the contingent remainderman was alive and ascertained. The particular estate was
destroyed by forfeiture if its tenant was convicted of treason or felony,
made a feoffment in fee, levied a fine in fee, or suffered a recovery in
fee. 17 The particular estate was destroyed by merger if, after it was
12 Fenwick v. Mitforth, Moore K. B. 284, 72 Eng. Rep. 583 (1589); Read v. Erington,
Cro. Eliz. 321, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594); Bingham's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 82b, 91a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 599, 611 (1600); Wills v. Palmer, 5 Burr. 2615, 98 Eng. Rep. 376 (1770); Doe ex
dem. Earl and Countess of Cholmondeley v. Maxey, 12 East 589, 104 Eng. Rep. 230 (1810).
This is known as the doctrine of worthier title.
13 Provost of Beverley's Case, Y. B. 40 Edw. 3, Hill. pl. 18 (1366). This is known as the
rule in Shelley's Case [1 Co. Rep. 93b, 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234, (1581)].
14 Dissenting opinion of Twisden, J. in Pybus v. Mitford, I Mod. 158, 161, 86 Eng. Rep.
800, 802 (1674); argument of Mr. Serjeant Glynn in Wills v. Palmer, 5 Burr. 2615, 2625, 98
Eng. Rep. 376, 381 (1770).
15 Davie v. Stevens, 1 Dougl. 321, 99 Eng. Rep. 207 (1780). This is known as the
rule in Wild's Case [6 Co. Rep. 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (1599)]. These cases involved
wills but the rule has been applied to the construction of deeds, also. Baird v. Brookin, 86 Ga.
709, 12 S.E. 981 (1891).
16 1 CORE, INSnTUTEs 378a, 1st Amer. ed., (1853); 1 FEAubm, CoNTINGENT RErrAINDErs 309, 10th ed., (1844).
17 Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628); 1 FEARNE, CoNTINGENT
REmA NDERs 316-324, 10th ed., (1844).
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created, the same person acquired both the particular estate and the
reversion or remainder following the contingent remainder, which
might happen by conveyance or inheritance. 8 So in the example last
mentioned, Lucy Baker, as tenant of the particular estate, could destroy
the contingent remainder to the heirs of John Stiles at any time before
the death of John. In sum, the common law did not permit the creation of indestructible interests in unborn persons. The best device
known to common law conveyancers before the Civil War (1642-1649)
for protecting the unborn against the avarice and improvidence of their
parents was to convey land to a husband and wife for their lives, remainder to the unborn children of the marriage. The husband and
wife could destroy the contingent remainder to their children before
their birth, but the cooperation of both spouses was required to do so. 9
In the thirteenth century, the conveyance to uses was invented, a
device which made it possible for a landowner to avoid some feudal
dues, to escape most of the rules which restricted inter vivos conveyances at common law, and to overcome the inconvenience occasioned
by the impossibility of transmitting land by will.20 John Stiles might
convey his land to his friends James Thorpe and Roger White and their
heirs upon their promise to allow John to use it during his lifetime and
his heirs to use it after his death. If John died leaving a minor daughter
as his heir, she would acquire the use of the land without the disadvantages of having to pay a relief and being subject to the overlord's
rights of wardship and marriage. The rights of the beneficiary of a
conveyance to uses were not initially enforcible in any tribunal and
the common law courts never did enforce them, but from the end of the
fourteenth century the lord high chancellors, who were nearly always
bishops, did so. They acted on the theory that persons who accepted
such a conveyance assumed moral duties toward the beneficiary of the
conveyance, known as the cestui que use, which they ought not in good
conscience to be allowed to breach. 21 The use device permitted great
flexibility in conveyancing and it is probable that it was possible, by
18 Thompson v. Leach, 2 Ventris 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 391 (1690); Burnsall v. Davy, 1
Bos. &Pul. 215, 126 Eng. Rep. 867 (1798).
19 Hargrave and Butler's note to 1 Corm, INs~rtrrEs 290b, 16th ed., (1809); Butler's
note to 1 FEAENE, CONTNGENT 1&EmAiNDEns 562, 10th ed., (1844); Professor Christian's
note to 2 BLACKST., COMM. 172, 12th ed., (1797).
203 BacToN, NoTE BooK pl. 999 Maitland ed., 1887; MATr..r, EQurTY 24-25, 2d
ed., (1936).
21 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399). Ames, "Origin of
Uses and Trusts," 21 HARv. L. Rv. 261 at 262, 274 (1908); Brown, "Ecclesiastical Origin
of the Use," 10 NorEa DAmE LAw. 353 at 361-366 (1935).
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means of it, to create indestructible interests in the unborn." However this may be, the free development of uses by the chancellors was
brought
to an abrupt halt in 1535 by the enactment of the Statute of
Uses, 23 which transformed the interest of a cestui que use into a legal
estate in land, enforcible, if at all, only in the common law courts.
As might be expected, the common law courts began to apply some
of the old restrictive rules to the new legal estates created by way of
use. It was held that any future estate which could have been created
as a remainder at common law would be treated as a remainder'even
though created by way of use.24 Accordingly, a contingent future interest which was preceded by a particular estate and so could have
existed as a contingent remainder at common law was a contingent
remainder and destructible by the tenant of the particular estate even
though created by way of use. 5
The Statute of Uses in terms deprived the High Court of Chancery
(court of the lord high chancellor) of all jurisdiction over uses created
on estates in land for life or in fee. Nevertheless it was soon settled
that the statute did not transform (execute) all such uses into legal
estates and that those which were not executed were enforcible by
the High Court of Chancery as trusts, in the same way in which all uses
were enforced before the enactment of the statute. The uses not executed were the use created by a conveyance which imposed active
27
So if
duties upon the conveyee 6 (trustee) and the use on a use.

John Stiles conveyed land to James Thorpe and his heirs upon his
promise to keep the premises in repair, rent them to tenants, collect the
rents, pay taxes, and pay over the net income to John during his lifetime and to John's children and their heirs after his death, legal title
22 See opinion of Gawdy, J. in Cliudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 135a, 76 Eng. Rep.
270, 306 (1595).
23 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535).
2
4 Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671).
25 Chudleigh's Case, I Co. Rep. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (1595); Archer's Case, I Co.
Rep. 66b (1597); Smith v. Belay, Cro. Eliz. 630, 78 Eng. Rep. 870 (1597). Future interests
created by way of use which could not have been created at common law, such as estates for
life or in fee to begin in the future and estates which cut off instead of succeeding prior
estates, known as executory interests, were determined to be indestructible, since they were
not dependent upon the existence of particular estates. Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79
Eng. 2Rep.
504 (1620).
6
,Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1545); Nevil v. Saunders, 1
Vern.2 7415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686).
Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (common law decision that use
on a use is not executed); Sambach v. Dalston, Tothill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (1634) (Chancery decision that use on a use is enforcible in Chancery); Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts,"
21 HAIv. L. Rnv. 261 at 270-274 (1908).
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did not pass to John and his children but instead remained in James
Thorpe as trustee, subject to a duty to perform the trust which was
enforcible in Chancery. Likewise, if John Stiles conveyed to Roger
White and his heirs to the use of James Thorpe and his heirs to the
use of (or upon trust for) John during his lifetime and afterward to
the use of (or upon trust for) John's children and their heirs, the Statute of Uses executed only the first use, leaving the legal title in James
Thorpe as trustee, subject to a like duty to perform the trust.
In this state of the law two eminent conveyancers, Sir Orlando
Bridgman and Sir Geoffrey Palmer, during the Interregnum (16491660), tried a bold experiment with the revived Chancery jurisdiction
over trusts in the hope of creating a contingent remainder in the unborn which would be indestructible. 2 Reduced to its essentials this
device, the strict settlement, was a conveyance to nominees (say James
Thorpe and Roger White) and their heirs to the use of John Stiles
for 99 years if he should so long live, remainder to the use of trustees
(say Andrew Baker and Lewis Gay) for the life of John Stiles upon
trust to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the use of the
unborn children of John Stiles and the heirs of their bodies. The Statute of Uses operated to transform the uses of John Stiles, the trustees,
and the unborn children into legal estates but it did not execute the
trust to preserve contingent remainders because it was a use on a use.
The result was that the trustees took a present vested life estate for the
life of John, subject to his term of years, with a legal contingent remainder to the unborn children. 2 As the trustees, not John, were the
holders of the particular estate, John could not, either alone or in co172, Cooley's 2d ed., (1872); 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY O ENGLAw 112 (1926); Lord Hardwicke, L.C. in Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 752, 753-755, 26
Eng. Rep. 1231, 1232-1233 (1753); note 19, supra. One of Bridgman's early forms of strict
settlement is reprinted in App. 3 to Holdsworth, op. cit., at 547-559. Bridgman was chief
justice of the Court of Common Pleas, 1660-1668, and lord keeper (i.e., acting lord high
chancellor), 1667-1672. This may account in part for the success of his earlier experiments
in conveyancing.
29 Another form of strict settlement, which was more questionable, was a conveyance
to the use of John for life, remainder to the use of trustees to preserve contingent remainders
for the life of John, remainder to the use of John's unborn children. Logically the remainder
to the trustees in this case would seem to be contingent and so destructible. Nevertheless it
was held to be vested and indestructible as in the type of settlement described in the text.
Duncomb v. Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437, 83 Eng. Rep. 770 (1697); see Parkhurst v. Smith ex.
dem. Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1740). A third form of strict settlement,
which is clearly valid and more likely to be found in the United States than the 'ther two, is
a conveyance to the use of trustees for the life of John upon trust for John and to preserve
contingent remainders, remainder to the use of John's unborn children. See Moody v.
Walters, 16 Ves. Jun. 283, 33 Eng. Rep. 992 (1809).
28 2 BLACKST. COMM.

LIsH
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operation with the tenant of an estate which followed, destroy the contingent remainder." Although the trustees, as tenants of the particular
estate, had legal power to destroy the contingent remainder, the High
Court of Chancery would compel anyone who took title from them
with knowledge of the trust or without paying a valuable consideration
to recreate the contingent remainder." If the trustees conveyed to a
bona fide purchaser for value, the High Court of Chancery would
compel the trustees to buy lands of equal value and convey them to
the wronged contingent remaindermen.32 Even if one person acquired
the beneficial estate which preceded the contingent remainder, the remainder in fee which succeeded it, and the estate of the trustees, the
usual doctrine of merger would not be permitted to destroy the contingent remainderman's rights.33 Thus, although the contingent remainderman's interest in the specific land was destructible by the trustees' breach of trust, as is that of any cestui que trust, his rights against
the trustee were not.
Under the strict settlement the estate of the unborn contingent
remainderman was a legal estate; the trustees held not the remainder
but the preceding particular estate, a life estate per autre vie, upon trust,
it should be noted, solely for the unborn donee of the contingent remainder. While a trust to preserve contingent remainders existed it
3

o Penhay v. Hurrell, 2 Vern. 370,23 Eng. Rep. 834; 2 Freem. 258, 22 Eng. Rep. 1195
(1702); Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem. Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1740); Garth
v. Cotton,
3 Atk. 752, 26 Eng. Rep. 1231 (1753).
3
1 Pye v. Gorge, I P. Wins. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323 (1710), affd. sub nom. Gorges v.
Pye, 7 Brown 221, 3 Eng. Rep. 144 (1712); see Else v. Osborn, 1 P. Wins. 387, 24 Eng. Rep.
437 (1717).
32
Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wins. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see Tipping v. Piggot,
1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1711). In rare cases of great hardship the High
Court of Chancery would direct the trustees to join in a conveyance to destroy contingent
remainders. Basset v. Clapham, 1 P. Wins. 358, 24 Eng. Rep. 425 (1717); Winnington v.
Foley, I P. Wins. 536, 24 Eng. Rep. 505 (1719); Moody v. Walters, 16 Ves. Jun. 283, 33
Eng. Rep. 992 (1809); but see Davis v. Weld, 2 Chan. Cas. 144, 22 Eng. Rep. 886 (1683);
Woodhouse v. Hoskins, 3 Atk. 22, 26 Eng. Rep. 816 (1743); Barnard v. Large, Amb. 774,
27 Eng. Rep. 496 (1780).
Trustees to preserve contingent remainders have been rare in American conveyancing
but there are a few cases holding that a trust of the particular estate prevents destruction of
legal contingent remainders which follow it, at least where the trust appears to have been
intended, in part, to protect such contingent remainders. Hunt v. Lawton, 76 Cal. App. 655,
245 P. 803 (1926); Braswell v. Downs, 11 Fla. 62 (1864); see Hayward v. Spaulding, 75
N.H. 92, 71 A. 219 (1908); Vanderheyden v. Crandall, (N.Y. 1846) 2 Denio 9; Ashhurst's
Appeal, 77 Pa. 464 (1875); see Dehon v. Redfern, Dud. Eq. 115 (S.C., 1838); see Young v.
McNeill, 78 S.C. 143, 59 S.E. 986 (1907); Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713
(1915); Webster v. Gilman, I Story 499, Fed. Cas. No. 17,335 (C.C. Me. 1841); contra:
Snelling v. Lamar, 32 S.C. 72, 10 S.E. 825 (1890) (dictum).
33 Mansell v. Mansell, supra, note 32.
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had no beneficiary in esse. The next experiment in creating indestructible interests in the unborn was a trust of the entire fee, with all beneficial interests given to a succession of cestuis que trustent. Thus land
might be conveyed to James Thorpe and Roger White and their heirs,
to the use of James Thorpe and Roger White and their heirs, upon trust
for John Stiles during his lifetime and after his death for the unborn
children of John Stiles and the heirs of their bodies. In this case it was
arguable that, although John Stiles could not affect the estate of the
trustees and so change his interest from an equitable estate to a legal
estate he could, as equity follows the law, destroy the equitable contingent remainder to his unborn children by destroying his own equitable life estate. The High Court of Chancery did not follow this
argument; it held instead that an equitable contingent remainder required no particular estate to support it, that it was not destroyed by
destruction of the preceding equitable estate, and that, as in the case
of the strict settlement, it was a breach of trust for the trustees to attempt to destroy the equitable contingent remainder.34 The reason for
this result was that contingent remainders by way of use were indestructible under the equity rules applied before the enactment of the Statute
of Uses and those not turned into legal estates by that statute remained
so. 35 The fact is, the High Court of Chancery had not forgotten that
the ecclesiastics who served as chancellors in mediaeval times, in developing the rules of uses, had applied a concept foreign to the strict, arbitrary rules of the common law of property; a concept of the moral duty
of the trustee to carry out his trust according to the intention expressed
in the instrument creating it.
Although it is possible to create a legal contingent future interest
in bonds, stocks, notes and like personalty in a living person, 3 1 it is difficult to support logically a legal contingent future interest in personalty
in an unborn person under the orthodox theory that, there being no
estates in personalty, the ultimate legal remainderman of personalty
34 Hopkins v. Hopkins, I Atk. 581, 26 Eng. Rep. 365 (1738); Atty.-Gen. ex. rel. Univ.
of Cambridge v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1 (1767); Astley v. Micklethwait,
L.R. 15 Ch. D. 59 (1880). See Cole v. Moore, Moore K.B. 806, 72 Eng. Rep.. 917 (1607),

Symance v. Tattam, 1 Atk. 613, 26 Eng. Rep. 385 (1737). An equitable tenant in tail could,
however, bar equitable remainders following the estate tail, whether vested or contingent, by
suffering a common recovery. Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jun. 120, 30 Eng. Rep. 926 (1796);
see supra, note 8. This seems to have been the rule as to uses before the Statute of Uses.

Anonymous, Brooks New Cases 91, 73 Eng. Rep. 887 (1483).

35 Opinion of Lord Hardwicke, L.C. in Hopkins v. Hopkins, supra, note 34, 1 Atk. 590,

26 Eng. Rep. 371; supra, note 22.
36 Flight v. Cook, 2 Ves. Sen. 619, 28 Eng. Rep. 394 (1755).
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takes the general property and prior life tenants take interests only as
usufructuaries or bailees. 7 However that may be, except as to estates
tail, the High Court of Chancery was willing to enforce equitable
future interests in personalty which corresponded to the possible future
interests in land. 38
It follows logically that if a man makes a voluntary conveyance of
property to trustees upon trust for himself during his lifetime and thereafter for his children, the unborni children take an indestructible interest and the settlor cannot revoke or modify the trust. The High Court
of Chancery so held, whether the trust property was land39 or securities constituting personalty"° and whether the trust was created in contemplation of marriage4 ' or was not.42 Another way of stating this
proposition is to say that, although the settlor of an inter vivos trust and
all the beneficiaries, acting together, may revoke the trust,43 the settlor

* and the ascertainable living beneficiaries may not revoke or modify the
trust, in absence of a reserved power of revocation, if there are unborn
or unascertained beneficiaries.44 The American decisions are virtually
unanimous in support of this proposition.45 Moreover, although if,
3

§ § 77-97, 821-855, 3rd ed., (1915); 1 Szrss,
§ 203 (1936). Strictly speaking, the term "remainder" is applicable
only to interests in land but it is a convenient designation for future interests in personalty
which would be remainders if they were interests in land and is so used herein.
3
8s Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. 607, 26 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1748); Blake v. Bunbury, 1 Ves.
Jun. 513, 30 Eng. Rep. 464 (1792); see Wright ex dem. Plowden v. Cartwright, 1 Burr.
282, 97 Eng. Rep. 315 (1757); ATHERLEY, LAW or MARRIAGE AND OTHER FAMILY SETrLEMENTs 24, 572-574 (1840).
3
9 Petre v. Espinasse, 2 My. & K. 496, 39 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1834); Hall v. Hall, L.R. 8
Ch. 430
(1873).
40
Anderson v. Dawson, 15 Ves. Jun. 532, 33 Eng. Rep. 856 (1808); Bill v. Cureton,
2 My. &K. 503, 39 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1835); Hansen v. Miller, 14 Sim. 22, 60 Eng. Rep. 264
(1844); Gardner v. Smith, 3 L.T. (O.S.) (Ch.) 238 (1844). As in the case of trusts to
preserve contingent remainders (supra, note 32) the High Court of Chancery has permitted
destruction of the interests of unborn beneficiaries of trusts in rare cases of great hardship.
Beatson v. Beatson, 12 Sim. 281, 59 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1841); Everitt v. Everitt, L.R. 10 Eq.
405 (1870). See also Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585, 37 Eng. Rep. (1822) (life beneficiary a
woman aged 69, birth of children to her improbable); Hastings v. Orde, 11 Sim. 205, 59
Eng. Rep. 853 (1840) (trust created in contemplation of a particular marriage which was
dissolved by act of Parliament). Such permission is consistent with the view that the interest
of a cestui que trust is not a property right in the strict sense but the result of a moral duty
imuosed upon the trustee which may be affected by a conflicting moral duty.
41 Anderson v. Dawson, Gardner v. Smith, supra, note 40.
42 Petre v. Espinasse, supra, note 39; Hall v. Hall, supra, note 39; Bill v. Cureton, supra,
note 40; Hansen v. Miller, supra, note 40.
432 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 338 (1935); 3 Scorr, LAw or TRUSTS, § 338 (1939).
442 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 338, comment f, § 339, comment b, § 340 and comments
d, e (1935); 3 ScoTT, LAW o, TRUSTS, § 340 (1939).
45Gray v. Union Trust Company, 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1915); Hills v. Travelers
Bank &Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A. (2d) 652 (1939) (settlor dead); Du Pont v. Du Pont,
7GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,

FUTURE INrERESTS,
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after the creation of a trust, the sole trustee becomes the sole beneficiary
also, the trust is destroyed by merger of the equitable interest in the
legal estate,4" the interest of an unborn contingent beneficiary is not
destroyed or affected by the sole trustee's becoming the only beneficiary
in being. Stated in other terms, once validly created, a trust is not
destroyed by merger of the equitable interest in the legal estate of the
trustee unless the trustee's equitable interest is coextensive with his
legal estate as trustee, which it is not if there is an equitable interest
outstanding in an unborn or unascertained cestui que trust.47 For example, if Andrew Baker conveys property to John Stiles upon trust
19 Del. Ch. 131, 164 A. 238 (1933); Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Howell, 186 Ga. 47,
196 S.E. 741 (1938); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E. 918 (1899); Ewing v.
Jones, 130 Ind. 247, 29 N.E. 1057 (1892); Dunn v. Dunn Trust, 219 Iowa 349, 258 N.W.
695 (1935); Lane v. Taylor, 287 Ky. 116, 152 S.W. (2d) 271 (1941); Peter v. Peter, 136
Md. 157, 110 A. 211 (1920); Sands v. Old Colony Trust Company, 195 Mass. 575, 81 N.E.
300 (1907); Ewing v. Warner, 47 Minn. 446, 50 N.W. 603 (1891); Simon v. Reilly, 126
N.J. Eq. 546, 10 A. (2d) 474 (1940); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298,
165 N.E. 454 (1929); Carson v. Carson, 60 N.C. 575 (1864); Donnan's Trust Estate, 339
Pa. 43, 13 A. (2d) 55 (1940); Neisler v. Pearsall, 22 R.I. 367, 48 A. 8 (1901); Folk v.
Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915); see Bottimore v. First Merchants Nat. Bank,
170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938); see Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 75 P. (2d) 132
(1938); Hurt v. Gilmer, (D.C. App. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 794; Walter's Trust v. Comm.
(C.C.A. 3rd, 1941) 127 F. (2d) 101; see Adriance v. Higgins, (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 30 F.
Supp. 70; see Re Luton, [1939] 3 D.L.R. 787 (Sup. Ct. Ont);'contra: Randall v. Randall,
(D.C. Fla. 1944) 60 F. Supp. 308.
A North Carolina statute empowers the grantor to revoke interests given by voluntary
deed to unascertained or unborn persons unless the deed is expressly irrevocable. Kirldand
v. Deck, 228 N.C. 439, 45 S.E. (2d) 538 (1947). A New York statute has been construed
to permit the settlor to revoke a trust with unborn beneficiaries if all living persons with any
possible interest consent. Smith v. Title Guarantee &Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E. (2d)
72 (1942); Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 295 N.Y. 488, 68 N.E. (2d)
503 (1946).
There are a few American decisions like those of the English High Court of Chancery
(supra, note 40) permitting revocation of trusts with unborn beneficiaries under conditions
of great hardship. Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N.J. Eq. 243 (1873); Smith v. Boyd, 61 N.J. Eq.
175, 47 A. 816 (1901); Russell's Appeal, 75 Pa. 269 (1874). Such cases usually involve
allegations of mistake or undue influence in addition to hardship.
The living beneficiaries of a testamentary trust are not entitled to revoke it if there are
unborn or unascertained beneficiaries. 2 TRusTs RE TATEmENT, § 337 (2), § 338, comment
a, § 340 (1) and comment d (1935).
46 2 TRusTs RESTATEMENT, § 341 (1) 1935; Goodright v. Wells, 2 Dougl. 771, 99 Eng.
Rep. 491 (1781); Selby v. Alston, 3 Ves. Jun. 339, 30 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1797).
47 Atty.-Gen. ex rel. Univ. of Cambridge v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1
(1767); Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jun. 120, 126-127, 30 Eng. Rep. 926, 929-930 (1796);
Merest v. James, 6 Madd. 118, 56 Eng. Rep. 1037 (1821); see In re Washburn's Estate, 11
Cal. App. 735 at 746-747, 106 P. 415 (1909); Hunt v. Lawton, 76 Cal. App. 655, 245 P. 803
(1926); Ewing v. Jones, 130 Ind. 247, 29 N.E. 1057 (1892); Hildreth v. Eliot, 25 Mass. 293
(1829); Ewing v. Warner, 47 Minn. 446, 50 N.W. 603 (1891); Isbam v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co., 11 N.J. Eq. 227 (1856); Wright v. Miller, 8 N.Y. 9, 59 Am.
Dec. 438 (1853); see Fox's Estate, 264 Pa. 478, 107 A. 863 (1919); Neisler v. Pearsall, 22
R.I. 367, 48 A. 8 (1901); Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915).
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for Andrew Baker during the lifetime of John and thereafter for the
unborn children of John, John's acquisition of Andrew's equitable life
estate by inheritance or purchase will not destroy the trust although
John is the sole trustee, and has acquired the interest of the settlor and
only beneficiary in being.
II
LIMITATIONS ON TnusTS FOR THM UNBOR

It is clear, then, that indestructible interests in unborn or unascertained persons may be created by way of legal remainder protected by a
trust of the particular estate or by way of equitable remainder in trust.
Two problems remain for consideration: (1) What limitations are
there upon the types of unborn or unascertained persons who may be
given such interests? and, (2) May such interests be created by a selfdeclaration of trust, as distinguished from a transfer upon trust, which
names no ascertained beneficiary except the declarant settlor?
As to the first problem, the beneficiaries must be ascertainable within
the period of the rule against perpetuities. 8 If this restriction is met, it
appears to be well settled that the settlor of a use or trust, although unmarried and not contemplating marriage, may create a beneficial interest
in his unborn children or issue4 ' or in his unascertained future wife or
widow." ° The Morsman trust instrument purported to create a contin48 1 TRusTs REsTATEMENT,
49 1 TRusTs RESTATEMENT,

§ 112 and comments c, d (1935).
§ 112, comment d, illustr. 5, § 127, comment b (1935);

Petre v. Espinasse, 2 My. & K. 496, 39 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1834); Bill v. Cureton, 2 My. & K.
503, 39 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1835); Du Pont v. Du Pont, 19 Del. Ch. 131, 164 A. 238 (1933);
Citizens & Southern Natl. Bank v. Howell, 186 Ga. 47, 196 S.E. 741 (1938); see Lowry
v. Tiernan, (Md., 1827) 2 Harr. & G. 34; see Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N.J. Eq. 243 (1873);
Wright v. Miller, 8 N.Y. 9, 59 Am. Dec. 438 (1853); Ash's Appeal, 80 Pa. 497 (1876);
Neislerv. Pearsall, 22 R.I. 367,48 A. 8 (1901); see Bottimore v. First & Merchants Natl. Bank,
170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Early, (D.C. Va. 1946)
67 F. Supp. 530.
50 Brent's Case, 3 Dyer 339b, 73 Eng. Rep. 766 (1583) (married man created good use
in "such person as he should chance to marry" if he survive his present wife); Wells v. Fenton,
Cro. Eliz. 826, 78 Eng. Rep. 1053 (1600) ("his wife who should be at the time of his death");
see Sammes' Case, 13 Co. Rep. 54, 56, 77 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1466 (1609) ("such a woman,
which he shall after marry"); Bill v. Cureton, 2 My. & K. 503, 39 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1835)
(any husband she might leave surviving); Citizens & Southern Nad. Bank v. Howell, 186 Ga.
47, 196 S.E. 741 (1938); Mercer v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company, 91 Md. 102 (1900)
(widow); Ash's Appeal, 80 Pa. 497 (1876) (any husband who might survive her); Chemical
Bank & Trust Co. v. Early, 67 F. Supp. 530 (D.C. Va. 1946). It is also possible for a settlor
to create a beneficial interest in the unascertained future wife or widow of another person who
is not contemplating marriage. E.g., Bould v. Wynston, Cro. Jac. 168, 79 Eng. Rep. 147, subnom. Bolls v. Winton, Noy 122, 74 Eng. Rep. 1086 (1606) (such a feme as settlor's son
afterward should marry); In re Park's Settlement, [1914] 1 Ch. 595 (son's widow); In re
Bullock's Will Trusts, [1915] 1 Ch. 493; In re Garham, 85 L.J. Ch. 646 (1916). See
Chaplin, "Future Trusts for a 'Husband', 'Wife', or 'Widow'," 36 YALE LAw J. 336-350
(1927).
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gent interest in the unborn issue of unborn issue. As has been seen, at
common law a legal remainder in land could not be given to the unborn
child of an unborn person.5 The English courts have held in modem
times that this rule extends to interests in land held in trust5 2 but that it
is inapplicable to personalty. In any event, the rule does not appear to
have been applied by any court in this country, as to either land or personalty, apparently on the theory that it has been superseded by the rule
against perpetuities.54
The majority opinion in the Morsman case appears to suggest that
the interest given to the heirs of the settlor was an attempted legal interest and to assert a positive rule of property that a man cannot convey an
interest in property, real or personal, legal or equitable, to his own right
heirs. 5 As legal title to corporate stock is normally transferable only by
delivery of the stock or of a deed of transfer, it is difficult to see how a
legal interest in stock could be transferred by a declaration of trust unless
there is a rule of law analogous to the Statute of Uses, which transforms
into a legal interest any equitable interest under a trust as to which the
trustee has no active duties. The Statute of Uses does not appear to be
in force in Nebraska5 0 and it does not apply to uses in personalty. The
existence of such a rule extending the operation of the Statute of Uses
is doubtful and its application to defeat a disposition which the settlor
manifested an intention to make is more so." It is true that under the
common law a man could not convey a legal remainder in land to his
own right heirs and an attempt to do so left a reversion in the transferor.58
51 Supra, note 11.
52 In re Nash, [19101 1 Ch. 1 (Ct. App.); In re Park's Settlement, [19141 1 Ch. 595;

see In re Bullock's Will Trusts, [1915] 1 Ch. 493; see In re Garnbam, 85 L.J. Ch. 646
(1916). The modern English cases seem to limit the rule to a remainder to an unborn person
succeeding a life estate in its unborn parent. Hockley v. Mawbey, 1 Ves. Jun. 143, 30 Eng.
Rep. 271 (1790). If so limited, the rule would appear to be inapplicable to the Morsman

trust. The rule was abolished in England by 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 161 (1925), the language of
which reflects an assumption that the rule is limited to land and to remainders succeeding a
life estate in an unborn person.

5s Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jun. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794); In re Bowles, [1902]
2 Ch. 650; In re Clarke's Settlement Trust [19161 1 Ch. 467.
S4 Lane v. Garrison, 293 Mo. 530, 239 S.W. 813 (1922); Brown v. Brown, 86 Tenn.
277, 7 S.W. 640 (1888); GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§ 298a-i, 3rd ed., (1915);
2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 487 (1936).
5590 F. (2d) 18 at 26, 27 (1937).

5G See Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 653, 256 N.W. 501 (1934).
57 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 70 (1935); 2 Id., § 345, comment a (1935); Sco-rr, LAw
or TRusTs, § 70 (1939). Cf. BOGERT, LAw oF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 207 (1935).
58 Supra, note 12. The probable reason for the rule is that, if a man could convey to his
own right heirs, he could cut off his overlord's feudal rights of relief, wardship and marriage
without in any way altering the course of transmission of the land at his death. Supra, note 4;
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The English decisions indicate that the rule is only one of construction
in instruments creating uses or trusts and that there will be no reversion
in the settlor if a contrary intention is manifested.59 In England the rule
did not apply to trusts of personalty, even as a rule of construction, unless
the gift was to the "executors and administrators" of the settlor; a gift of
personalty to the "heirs," "next of kin," or "persons who would be entitled to the property if the settlor died the owner and intestate' was
effective in accordance with its terms and did not leave a reversion in
the settlor. ° The Restatement of Property takes the position that a conveyance of an interest in either land or personalty to the "heirs" of the
donor may be effective if an intent that it shall be is manifested but that
there is a rebuttable presumption that a reversion is intended; that is,
the ancient rule is continued as a rule of construction."' The Restatement of Trusts takes a similar position as to interests under trusts of both
land and personalty. 2 This is probably the prevailing view in the United
States.63 The majority opinion in the Morsman case stresses that the
1 SIM.Es, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 145 (1936).

The rule was abolished in England by 3 & 4

Will. 4, c. 106, § 3 (1833).
59
Nandike v. Wilkes, Gilb. Rep. 114, 25 Eng. Rep. 80 (1716); Trevor v. Trevor, 1 Eq.
Cas. Abr. 387, 21 Eng. Rep. 1122 (1719); Locke v. Southwood, 1 My. & Cr. 411, 40 Eng.
Rep. 433 (1831), affd. sub. nom. Bush v. Locke, 3 Cl. &Fin. 721, 6 Eng. Rep. 1607 (H. of
L., 1835); see Sackville-West v. Viscount Holmesdale, L.R. 4 H.L. 543 (1870).
60 Anderson v. Dawson, 15 Ves. Jun. 532, 33 Eng. Rep. 856 (1808); Hansen v. Miller,
14 Sim. 22, 60 Eng. Rep. 264 (1844). In dispositions of personalty the word "heirs" is taken
literally, i.e., the persons who would take real estate on intestacy, not the next of kin. Hamilton
v. Mills, 29 Beav. 193, 54 Eng. Rep. 601 (1861).
61 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, § 314 (1) (1940). The common law rule did not apply
if the persons described as "heirs" were not the right heirs of the donor; that is, if the gift was
to a limited group of heirs, to heirs in proportions other than those they would take on intestacy, or to heirs to be determined at some time other than the donor's death or by some law
other than that which would govern the descent of the property if he had died the owner.
Esquire Mantel's Case, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1543); Woodliff v. Drury,
Cro. Eliz. 439, 78 Eng. Rep. 679 (1595); Wood v. Reignold, Cro. Eliz. 764, 78 Eng. Rep.
996 (1598); see Sammes' Case, 13 Co. Rep. 54, 77 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1609); Gilpin's Case,
Cro. Car. 161, 79 Eng. Rep. 740 (1629); Pybus v. Mitford, 3 Keble 339, 84 Eng. Rep. 754
(1674); Southcott v. Stowell, Freem. K.B. 216, 225, 89 Eng. Rep. 154, 161 (1676); Locke
v. Southwood, supra, note 59. It could be argued that, as the settlor might not be domiciled
in Nebraska at the time of his death, the provision that the heirs should be determined according to Nebraska law made the rule inapplicable, even as a rule of construction. See 3 PnorPRTYr REsTATEmE r, § 305, comment u. Some of the American cases cited infra, note 63,
involve this question.
62 1 TRusTs RESTATEMENT, § 127, comment a (1935). Unfortunately the Restatement,
like the courts, tends to confuse this rule with the rule in Shelley's Case (supra, note 13).
63 Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637 at 639, 154 P. 306 (1915); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 M. 248, 54 N.E. 918 (1899); Burton v. Boren, 308 M. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923);
Ewing v. Jones, 130 Ind. 247, 29 N.E. 1057 (1892); Ewing v. Warner, 47 Minn. 446, 50
N.W. 603 (1891); Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Johnston, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 211 (1906); Kensett
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 116 Md. 526, 82 A. 981 (1911); Peter v. Peter, 136 Md. 157,
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settlor's motive was to avoid taxes based upon his ownership of the stock
involved."4 If so, it would seem that any presumption in favor of an intention to retain a reversionary interest in himself was overcome.
It will be recalled that the High Court of Chancery, from the end
of the fourteenth century, would compel one who accepted a conveyance
of land for the use of another to hold it for such use." A specifically
enforcible use could also be created by a contract supported by a valuable
consideration, known as a bargain and sale. 6 In both cases the theory
was that the owner, having received something of value in return for his
promise to stand seised to uses, was bound in conscience to do so. Early
in the sixteenth century it was suggested that if the owner of land covenanted to stand seised to the use of a relative and his intended wife, this
too should create enforcible uses, because the covenant bound his conscience. 7 This idea originated at a time when England was Catholic
and it was generally believed that a man could bind his conscience by a
vow, which was looked upon as a contract with God. How the idea
110 A. 211 (1920); Sands v. Old Colony Trust Company, 195 Mass. 575, 81 N.E. 300
(1907); National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944);
Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1922); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Parfner,
135 N.J. Eq. 133, 37 A. (2d) 675 (1944); Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221
(1919); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Company, 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929);
Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N.Y. 358, 196 N.E. 288 (1935); Engel v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 43, 19 N.E. (2d) 673 (1939); Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust
Co., 295 N.Y. 488, 68 N.E. (2d) 503 (1946); Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464 (1875); King
v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 A. 227 (1923); Taylor v. Lindsay, 14 R.I. 518 (1884);
Bd. of Dir. of Theological Seminary v. Lowrance, 126 S.C. 89, 119 S.E. 383 (1923); Bottimore v. First & Merchants Natl. Bank, 170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938); Comm. v. Bacher,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 500; Beach v. Busey, (C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 496;
see Adriance v. Higgins, 30 F. Supp. 70 (D.C. N.Y. 1939) (trust of land and personalty
for heirs and next of kin in default of appointment by will created remainder); Re Luton,
[1939] 3 D.L.R. 787 (Sup. Ct. Ont.) (trust of property to pass "as upon an intestacy" in
default of appointment by will left reversion in settlor).
64 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 18 at 21, 22.
6
5 Supra, note 21.
66 Anonymous, Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, Pasch., pl. 15 (1535).
67 Lady Wilshire v. Duke of Buckingham, Y.B. 20 Hen. 7, Mich. pl. 20 (Exch. Ch.,
1505). The question was not decided in this case. The term "covenant to stand seised" implies contract and the fact that it was usually an indenture rather than a deed poll does likewise. The covenantee could not, however, sue for breach of the covenant as such. GILBERT,
LAw o1 Usas Ar TRuSTs 242, 3rd ed., (1811). In consequence, unless the covenantee
was named as a cestui que use, he was only a straw party, a mere witness to the covenantor's
assumption of a conscientious obligation. If the transaction was a contract at all it was a
contract with God rather than with the covenantec. A form for a covenant to stand seised to
uses which includes unborn beneficiaries is printed in SANDERS, UsEs AND TRUSTS 439-440

(1792).
68 CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, book 4, c. 13, § 1, 7th Amer. ed.,
(1936). Dr. Calvin, himself a lawyer, uses the language, "resemble covenants, or instruments

of agreement." Id., § 6.
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would have been developed by lord high chancellors who were Roman
Catholic bishops we cannot know, for in 1535 the Statute of Uses transferred the development of uses to the common law courts and the reigns
of Edward VI (1546-1553) and Elizabeth (1558-1603) saw the reception of the Protestant thesis that vows not authorized by Scripture do not
bind the conscience. 9 In any event, prior to the Statute of Uses a covenant to stand seised to uses could not have served the usual purposes of
a conveyance to uses, preventing forfeiture on the attainder of the covenantor, avoiding the feudal burdens of reliefs, wardship and marriage at
his death, and substituting for a will. After the statute it offered a simple
means of transferring legal title which, unlike the bargain and sale, did
not have to be enrolled. The covenant to stand seised had, however,
certain technical defects as a conveyance which reduced its use and deprived us of the wealth of precedent as to its possibilities which exists in
the case of the conveyance to uses or upon trust20
In 1543 it was decided that a land owner could, in consideration of
marriage and £100, covenant to stand seised to the use of his wife for life
and afterward to the use of the unborn heirs of his body by her.7 In
69 CALvIN, op. cit., supra, note 68, book 4, c. 13, § § 20, 21. Following this thesis Dr.
Martin Luther, an Augustinian eremite, and Catherine von Bora, a Cistercian nun, were
married
on June 13, 1525, although both had taken vows of celibacy.
70
SANDERS, USES AND TRusTs 434-440 (1792); 4 HoLDswoRm, HISTORY op ENGLISi
LAw 425-427 (1924); 7 Id., 356-360 (1926). The chief restrictions were that the covenant
must be by deed under seal [Callard v. Callard, Moore K.B. 687, 72 Eng. Rep. 841 (1597);
Roe ex dem. Wilkinson v. Tranmer, 2 Wils. K.B. 75, 95 Eng. Rep. 694 (1757)]; and that,
in the absence of valuable consideration, it could not raise a use in anyone who was not
presently or prospectively related to the covenantor by blood or marriage. 2 ROLLE, ABRIDGMENT, USES, 784 (1), pl. 5 (1668). The latter restriction prevented raising a use in trustees
to preserve contingent remainders where the trustees were not related to the covenantor, even
though the contingent remaindermen were so related. Whaley v; Tankard, 2 Lev. 52, 83 Eng.
Rep. 445 (1673). It also prevented giving a power to appoint to persons not related to the
covenantor. Mildmay's Case, I Co. Rep. 175a, 76 Eng. Rep. 379 (1584). These deficiencies
made the covenant to stand sdised unsatisfactory for family settlements and explain why it
ceased to be used for that purpose. Chancellor Kent's explanation, that uses could not be
raised in persons not in esse by bargain and sale or covenant to stand seised [4 KENT. COMM.
496, llth ed., (1867)] is clearly wrong. See GRAY, RULi AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§ 61-66
(3rd ed., 1915). This erroneous statement of Chancellor Kent was relied upon in Bradford
v. Griffin, 40 S.C. 468, 19 S.E. 76 (1894). The case is criticized by Professor Gray. Id.,
§ 398a.
The earlier writers thought that a covenant to stand seised might give rise to an action
at common law for damages for breach in cases where the High Court of Chancery, prior to
1535, would not have decreed specific performance. 5 BAcON, NEw ABRIDGMENT OF THE
LAW 363, 3rd ed., (1770). We are not here concerned with this strictly contract aspect of
such covenants, whether or not a modern court of equity would decree specific performance.
See I TRUSTS, RESTATEMENT, § 197, comment b.
71 Esquire Mantel's Case, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1543); see Bedell's
Case, 7 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 470 (1607).
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1565 it was held that a man could covenant to stand seised to the use of
himself for life, remainder to the use of his brother and the brother's
wife for their lives, remainder to the unborn heirs of the body of the
brother, although there was no consideration other than the relationship.72 An owner contemplating marriage could covenant to stand seised
to the use of himself until the marriage, then to the use of himself and
his intended wife and the heirs of their bodies.7 3 A man could covenant
to stand seised to the use of his son for life and after to the use of any
woman whom the son might marry, remainder to the unborn son of the
son and the heirs of the body of that unborn son.74 In these cases the
Statute of Uses turned the estates of the cestuis que use into legal estates
but the decisions may be considered precedents as to the possibilities of
creating trusts, since the statute had no application unless a valid use was
created in accordance with the concepts of equity. 7 A covenant to stand
possessed of securities to the use of relatives, born and unborn, after the
death of the covenantor, created a valid trust which, since the Statute
of Uses was inapplicable to personalty, was enforcible in Chancery.76
Early in the nineteenth century it was determined that a declaration of
trust of personalty, unlike the otherwise equivalent covenant to stand
seised of land, was valid even though there was no valuable consideration and the beneficiaries were not related to the covenantor by blood
or marriage.7 This made the declaration of trust a convenient method
of settling personalty in trust and it has been used extensively for that
purpose in modern times. Recent decisions have tended to treat the
72 Sharington v. Strotton, 1 Plowden 298, 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (1565). See Doe ex dem.
Dyke v. Whittingham, 4 Taunt. 20, 128 Eng. Rep. 234 (1811). Cf. Legout v. Price, 318
Ill. 425, 149 N.E. 427 (1925), criticized by Professor Bigelow in "Springing Uses in Illinois,"
20 ILL. L. REv. 662-673 (1926).
73
Wood v. Reignold, Cro. Eliz. 764, 78 Eng. Rep. 996 (1598); Trevor v. Trevor, 1 Eq.
Cas. Abr. 387,21 Eng. Rep. 1122 (1719); Warwick v. Gerrard, 2 Veto. 7, 23 Eng. Rep. 617
(1686) (covenant by an unmarried woman to stand seised to the use of herself for life, remainder to the heirs of her body, remainder as she might appoint by will or deed, remainder
in default of appointment to a named relative and his heirs).
74
Bould v. Wynston, Cro. Jac. 168, 79 Eng. Rep. 147, sub. nom. Bolls v. Winton, Noy
122, 74 Eng. Rep. 1086 (1606).
75 1 SimEs, FTuRE INTrEsTs 46 (1936).
76 See Richardson v. Sedgwicke, 2 Brown 123, 1 Eng. Rep. 833 (1731).
77
Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. Jun. 140, 34 Eng. Rep. 271 (1811). The beneficiary in this
case was an illegitimate child of the settlor but love and affection for a bastard child of the
covenantor had never been deemed sufficient to support a covenant to stand seised to its use.
Gerrarde v. Worseley, 3 Dyer 374a, 73 Eng. Rep. 839 (1579); 5 BACON, NEw ABRIDGMENT
oF THE LAW 367, 3rd ed., (1770). The older opinion seems to have been that a use could
not be raised in personalty without consideration. Lyte v. Peny, 1 Dyer 49a, 73 Eng. Rep.
108 (1541); 25 HARv. L. Rrv. 671 (1912).

MIcmG

LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 47

declaration of trust as having the same efficacy and effects as a transfer
upon trust. 8 Prima facie, it would seem that any indestructible interest
in personalty in unborn or unascertained persons which could be created by a transfer upon trust can be created by a declaration of trust.
The majority opinion in the Morsman case holds that a trust which
has no beneficiary in being except the settlor cannot be created by a
declaration of trust because a trust involves severance of the legal and
equitable titles to the trust property, which necessitates the existence
of some beneficiary capable of holding equitable title and suing the
trustee to enforce the trust. 9 The opinion concedes that a trust may be
created by transfer although no presently ascertainable beneficiary other
than the trustee is named and this is certainly true. As has been seen,
a trust to preserve contingent remainders has no beneficiary in being.
The accumulation cases recognize the validity of trusts created by transfer for the sole purpose of accumulating wealth for disposition to unborn persons.80 Trusts for the sole benefit of corporations to be created
7

8 Sutherland, J. in Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 at 50, 56 S.Ct.
78 (1935): "By the declaration of trust here under review, the legal title, possession and
control of the trust estate passed irrevocably from the grantor as an individual to himself as
trustee. The effect is no different than if the trustee had been another person."
Stern, J. in Glosser Trust, 355 Pa. 210 at 214, 215, 49 A. (2d) 401 (1946): 'That the
donors made themselves the trustees is of no legal significance in regard to the problem here
involved. It is, of course, always competent for a person creating a trust to become himself
the trustee, and, if a trust is intended, it will be equally effectual whether the donor transfers
the title to a third person as trustee or declares that he himself holds the property for the purposes of the trust."
See also South End Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurwitz, 128 Conn. 204, 21 A. (2d) 407
(1941); Dunn v.'Dunn Trust, 219 Iowa 349, 258 N.W. 695 (1935); Spilman v. Mercer
County Natl. Bank, 268 Ky. 761, 105 S.W. (2d) 1031 (1937); Wenzel v. Powder, 100 Md.
36, 59 A. 194 (1904); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1935); Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359 (1906); see Haggerty v. Squire, 137
0. 207, 28 N.E. (2d) 554 (1940); Bd. of Dir. of Theological Seminary v. Lowrance, 126 S.C.
89, 119 S.E. 383 (1923); United Building & Loan Assn. v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (D.C.
Ark. 1946). In the South Carolina case a man contemplating marriage executed a declaration
of trust of land for the joint use of the settlor and his intended wife for their lives, remainder
to the children of the marriage, but in default of children surviving the intended wife, reversion to the settlor, his heirs or devisees, free of trust. It was held that the reversion was legal,
not equitable, which was a sound construction of the instrument involved, but that the contingent interests of the intended wife and unborn children were valid. Except for the facts
that the settlor was contemplating marriage and his intended wife was an ascertained person,
these facts were much like those of the Morsman case. Of course, as in the case of a transfer
upon trust, if the settlor retains full beneficial control of the property, imposing no duties
upon himself and merely purporting to give himself powers which he already had as owner,
no trust is created, because he has not bound his conscience. Ponzelino v. Ponzelino, 26 N.W.
(2d) 330 (Iowa, 1947).
79 90 F. (2d) 18 at 24-26 (1937).
80

Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jun. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (1799) (testamentary
trust to accumulate during the lives of all of testator's male descendants living at the time of
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in the future have been recognized as valid."1 A conveyance to a person
as trustee for himself and his unborn children has been held to create
an enforcible trust.8 2 The opinion contends that such trusts are sustained upon the theory that, until a beneficiary other than the trustee
comes into being and is ascertained, the interest of the beneficiaries
remains in the settlor by way of resulting trust and is prevented from
merging into the legal estate of the trustee only by the fact that the
settlor
the trustee are different persons.88
Theand
early
common law authorities were unanimous in declaring
that
a legal contingent remainder in fee simple, while it remained contingent, was not owned by anyone, that is, it was in abeyance or, in the
quaint mediaeval phrase, "in nubibus" (in the clouds). 4 The early
view was that no reversionary interest was left in the donor in such a case,
but this was later seen to be erroneous in that there was always a possibility that the contingent remainder would fail and the land revert to
the donor, so it came to be held that, in conveyances of contingent uses,
a reversion remained in the donor until the contingent remainderman
came into being. 5 If John Stiles conveyed land to James Thorpe and
his death for the sole benefit of descendants then unborn, equitable remainder in default of
eligible descendants to the trustees themselves); Harrison v. Harrison, mentioned 4 Ves. Jun.
286, 338, 31 Eng. Rep. 146, 171 (1787) (testamentary trust to accumulate for the
unborn second son of a five year old child); Webb v. Earl of Shaftesbury, mentioned 4 Ves.
Jun. 287, 31 Eng. Rep. 146 (1799) (testamentary trust to accumulate for the unborn second
son of a small child); Ashurst v. Given, 5 Watts & S. 323 (Pa., 1843) (testamentary trust
to accumulate for the unborn children of the trustee and, in default of issue of the trustee,
for the heirs of the testator determined as of the death of the trustee); 1 TnusTs RESTATEMENr, § 2, comment j, § 112, illustr. 6.
81 Atty.-Gen. ex rel. Univ. of Cambridge v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1
(1767); see Olympia Mining & Milling Co. v. Kerns, 24 Idaho 481, 135 P. 255 (1913);
Kahle v. Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod, 81 Minn. 7, 83 N.W. 460 (1900); Salem Capital Flour Mills Co. v. Stayton Water-Ditch & Canal Co., 33 Fed. 146 (C.C. Ore. 1887); 1
TrusTs RESTATEMENT, § 112, comment e (1935).
82 Heyward-Williams Co. v. McCall, 140 Ga. 502, 79 S.E. 133 (1913) (inter vivos
conveyance of land to the grantee as trustee for her unborn children, remainder in default of
children as she should appoint); Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915). See 1
TrusTs RESTATEMENT, §§ 99 (2), 115 (3), 127, comment b (1935).
83 90 F. (2d) 18 at 24-25. The opinion relies upon 1 BoGERT, LAw oF TRusTs ANm
TRtLsTEEs, § 163 (1935). The theory is analogous to the bitterly contested theory of "scintilla
juris" in feoffees to contingent uses, as to which see 7 HoLDswoTH, HisToRY OF ENGLISH
LAw 138-141 (1926). Professor Bogert does not suggest that the theory is applicable if the
trustee or someone else is a present living beneficiary of the trust. Unlike the Morsman
opinion, he appears to apply it only to the case of a trust with no ascertainable beneficiaries.
84 1 CoKa, INsTrruTEs 342b, 1st Amer. ed., (1853); 2 BL^cxsT. COMM. 107, (Cooley's
2d ed., 1872); Opinions of Manwood and Dyer, JJ. in Brent's Case, 3 Dyer 339b, 340a, 73
Eng. Rep. 766, 767 (1583); Opinion of Gawdy, J. in Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a,
135a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270, 305 (1595); Mr. Serjeant Williams' note to Purefoy v. Rogers, 2
Wms.Saund. 380, 382, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181, 1183 (1671).
. 85 Plunket v. Holmes, Raym. Sir T. 28, 30, 83 Eng. Rep. 15, 17 (1661): "Until the
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Roger White to the use of or on trust for John for life, remainder to
John's unborn children and their heirs, there was a possibility that John
might have no children, in which case the use would revert to the right
heirs of John. So also, if John conveyed to James Thorpe and Roger
White to the use of John for life, remainder to John's children and their
heirs, but if John have no children, then to Andrew Baker and his heirs,
there was a possibility that the contingent remainders would be destroyed
by the destruction of John's life estate, with consequent reversion in fee
to John and his heirs. The same sort of reversionary interest, by way of
resulting trust, remains in the settlor of an active trust where the trust
instrument does not make a complete disposition of the equitable title
upon all possible contingencies.8" In the case of the active trust, however, contingent remainders are not destructible and therefore there is
no possibility of an actual beneficial reversion to the settlor if the terms
of the trust provide for the disposition of the entire beneficial interest in
the property upon all possible contingencies. If, as suggested above, the
trust instrument in the Morsman case should be construed to give the
settlor's heirs an interest by way of purchase, it would seem that the
terms of that instrument provided for disposition upon all possible contingencies. The doctrine of reversion or resulting trust is merely that a
donor retains what he has not disposed of;87 the majority opinion in the
contingency happen, the fee descends to the heir in some sort, but not to confound the estate
for life [the settlor's heir was the life tenant], but there shall be an hiatus to let in the contingency when it happens ...."; Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saund. 380, 382, 85 Eng. Rep.
1181, 1182 (1671); Carter v. Barnadiston, I P. Wms. 505, 24 Eng. Rep. 492 (1718); see
Lodington v. Kime, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 183, 21 Eng. Rep. 974 (1697); 1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT
REMAINDERS, 360-364, 10th ed., (1844); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTEREsTS, § 45 (1936). See
Slack v. Downing, 233 Ky. 554, 26 S.W. (2d) 497 (1930).
86 Hopkins v. Hopkins, I Atk. 581, 26 Eng. Rep. 365 (1738); 2 TnusTs REsTATEMENT,
§ § 404, 430 and comment h (1935).
87
Bould v. Wynston, Cro. Jac. 168, 79 Eng. Rep. 147, sub. nom. Bolls v. Winton, Noy
122, 74 Eng. Rep. 1086 (1606). In this case Sir Henry Wynston covenanted to stand seised
to the use of his eldest son William for life and after to the use of such a feme as William
afterward should marry, for life, remainder to the first son of William in tail. Under even the
early common law decisions this left a reversion in Sir Henry because the contingent remainders were not in fee simple. Later, William being in Gloucester Gaol and about to marry the
gaoler's daughter, Sir Henry leased the land to a younger son for 1000 years in the hope of
barring the use to William's future wife. William married and died without issue and his
widow brought ejectment. It was argued for the defendant that Sir Henry's reversion included
the contingent uses, so that they were bound by his lease. The court rejected this contention,
holding that the lease bound Sir Henry's reversion but did not bind William's widow; that is,
that the reversion did not include the interests of contingent remaindermen. This decision is
probably a rejection of the doctrine of "scintilla juris" also, as to which see note 83, supra. See
also Wood v. Reignold, Cro. Eliz. 764, 78 Eng. Rep. 996 (1598); Wells v. Fenton, Cro. Eliz.
826, 78 Eng. Rep. 1053 (1600); Trevor v. Trevor, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 387, 21 Eng. Rep. 1122
(1719). There is dictum to the contrary in Den ex dem. Borden v. Thomas, 28 N.C. 209
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Morsman case distorts it into a doctrine that the donor of a contingent
interest retains not only what he has not disposed of but also the interest
of the contingent remainderman.
If this thesis of the majority opinion in the Morsman case were
sound, the interest of unborn contingent remaindermen would seem to
remain in the settlor when there were living beneficiaries as well as when
there were none, at least if none of the living beneficiaries belonged to
the same class as the unborn. It has already been seen that the settlor
cannot destroy contingent remainders in trust, even though all the living beneficiaries consent 8 and that they are not destroyed by merger
when the sole trustee obtains the interests of the settlor and all living
beneficiaries.8 Although it is proper to distinguish between merger
which destroys a previously created valid trust and the same union of
(1845) stating that the grantor of a legal life estate with legal contingent remainder retained
the "seizin" until the contingent remainderman was born. All that was decided was that the
life tenant could not destroy the contingent remainder.
88 Supra, note 45.
89
See Mansell v. Mansell, supra, note 32; Ewing v. Jones, Ewing v. Warner, Isham v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co., Merest v. James, Neisler v. Pearsall, Wright v.
Miller, supra, note 47. In Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1913) a father conveyed land to his son, who had no children, for life upon trust for the son and his children,
remainder to the son's children. The son, before birth of children, reconveyed to the father
in fee. After children were born to the son, the father conveyed to the son in fee. For a time,
therefore, the father was settlor and assignee of the trustee and only living beneficiary. It was
held, nevertheless, that the contingent interest in the unborn children was not destroyed or
affected.
In Atty.-Gen. ex rel. Univ. of Cambridge v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1
(1767) a testator devised land to trustees to the use of Sir Jacob Downing for life, .with
remainders to various persons, remainder upon failure of the previous remainders to the use
of the trustees upon trust to secure land at Cambridge and a royal charter for a college to be
called Downing College and then to stand seised to the use of the college. All the trustees died
during the lifetime of the testator. The devise to them having lapsed, the legal title descended
to Sir Jacob as sole heir of the testator. All the remainders preceding that to the trustees
failed during the lifetime of Sir Jacob. This left Sir Jacob seised in fee simple to his own use
for life, holding the use in remainder upon trust for a corporation not to be created until after
his death. Although Sir Jacob had inherited all interest of the testator, the lord high chancellor, the lord chief justice and the master of the rolls, sitting together, held the trust enforcible against Sir Jacob's devisee. This was a charitable trust but Lord Chief Justice Wilmot's
opinion declares that it would have been good if it were a private trust and the beneficiary an
unborn person, so long as the beneficiary would be ascertainable within the period of the rule
against perpetuities. Wilm. 16, 97 Eng. Rep. 6, 7 (1767).
In Bass River Savings Bank v. Nickerson, 303 Mass. 332, 21 N.E. (2d) 717 (1939) a
man conveyed land to his son's wife so long as she remained the wife or widow of his son,
then to the heirs at law of the son. The son's wife died during her husband's lifetime. It
was held that the fee reverted to the grantor on the death of the wife but subject to a springing executory use in the unascertainable heirs of the son which became possessory upon the
son's death. The court thought that the grantor did not intend to reserve to himself or his
heirs or devisees any-estate that could operate to defeat the interest given to the unascertained
heirs of the son.
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interests existing at the inception of an attempted trust,90 this is a strong
indication that the settlor does not retain, in any real sense, the interest
of contingent remaindermen.
In a case which arose shortly after the enactment of the Statute of
Uses, it was held that where a land owner at the time of his marriage

had covenanted to stand seised to the use of his wife for life and afterward to the heirs of his body by her, the land was not forfeited when he
was attainted of felony. 9' As the attainder forfeited any interest which
90

Evans, "The Termination of Trusts," 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1102 (1928). A few cases
have held that where, at the inception of the trust, the sole trustee is also the sole beneficiary
for life, there is a partial merger, leaving him as owner of a legal beneficial life estate and
trustee for the remaindermen only. See Bolles v. State Trust Co., 27 N.J. Eq. 308 (1876);
Wilson v. Harrold, 288 Il.388, 123 N.E. 563 (1919); 1 Scor, LAw o TnusTs, § 99.3
(1939); 1 BOGERT, LAW o TRusTs AND TEUsTEES, § 129 (1935). They are probably a
result of confusing the doctrine of merger with the rules of partial execution of uses by the
Statute of Uses, which relate to a wholly different problem. These decisions conflict with the
English doctrine that there is no merger unless the trustee has the entire beneficial interest
under the trust [Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jun. 120, 30 Eng. Rep. 926, (1796)] and they
are not supported by the American Law Institute. 1 TRuSTs RESTATEMENT, § 99 (2) (1935).
The better-reasoned cases take the position that there is no partial merger in such a case, pointing out that the trust of the life interest is to protect the remaindermen as well as the life
beneficiary, as was one form of the trust to preserve contingent remainders (see supra, note
29). Nellis v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 66 P. 32 (1901); Fox's Estate, 264 Pa. 478, 107 A. 863
(1919); In re Erdman Estate, 352 Pa. 158,42 A. (2d) 546 (1945). In any event, the fact
that the trustee is beneficiary for life should not affect the validity of the trust of the remainder. If it did, a substantial proportion of covenants to stand seised and declarations of
trust cited in other notes should be deemed nullities. One case holding that the fact that a
trustee of a slave was beneficiary for life destroyed the remainder in trust [Butler v. Godley,
12 N.C. 94, (1826)] is evidently a confused recrudescence of the ancient idea that there
could not be a legal future interest in a chattel. See GRAY, tur AGAINST PERPETumEs, §
94, 3rd ed., (1915).
9
1Esquire Mantel's Case, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1543). Cf. Sir
Thomas Palmer's Case, Moore K.B. 815, 72 Eng. Rep. 924; Noy 102, 74 Eng. Rep. 1068
(Star Chamber, 1611). There Buskin Palmer had covenanted to stand seised-to the use of
himself for life, remainder to the use of Thomas Palmer for life, remainderf6 the first and other
sons of Thomas in tail, remainder to the right heirs of Buskin. Before the first son of Thomas
was born, Buskin was attainted of treason and executed. The judges in the Star Chamber decided that the attainder destroyed the contingent remainder to the unborn sons of Thomas so
that the crown took the fee simple, free of uses, on the death of Thomas. On its face this decision
appears to conflict with Esquire-Mantel's Case but there are three possible explanations; any of
which would prevent it from doing so. The first and most probable is that the covenant to stand
seised was executed after Buskin, the covenantor, had committed treason. The prosecution was
by indictment, in which case the judgment effected a forfeiture which related back to the date
of the crime. 1 COKE, INSTITuTEs 390 b, 1st Amer. ed., (1853). The covenant was executed
"anno 7 Ed. 6" (January 28, 1552-53 to July 6, 1553). The crime was conspiracy to place
Lady Jane Grey on the throne. Regina v. Dudley, et al., 1 How. St. Tr. 765 at 768 (1553).
The conspiracy must have existed at the time Edward VI's will was being prepared and
executed, June 11-21, 1553, probably existed when Lady Jane Grey married Lord Guildford
Dudley in May 1553, and may have been formed at the time the king contracted measles and
smallpox in April 1552. 1 GORDON, GENERAL HISTORY o THE LIVEs, TnmAxs AND ExEcuTIONS o ALL THE ROYAL AND NOBLE PERSONAdES THAT HAvE SUFFERED IN GREAT BrTAIN
AND IRELAND Eon HIGH TEEASON, OR OTHER CamRis 422-430 (1760).

A second possible
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was in him at the time of the judgment," which was before his death
and whil the heirs of his body were still unascertainable, this is an even
stronger indication that the settlor of a use or trust with contingent beneficiaries does not retain the interest of the contingent beneficiaries by
way of resulting use or trust. The case cannot be explained on the
ground that the king or the overlord received the fee subject to the contingent use because the king could not be seised to uses and an overlord
who took by escheat or forfeiture took free of uses.93 We may be sure
that Henry VIII's judges would not have deprived their royal master of
any such promising source of revenue if they had thought it possible to
avoid doing so.
It will be remembered that the majority opinion in the Morsman
case gives as its reason for holding that, although trusts solely for unascertained beneficiaries can be created by transfer, they cannot be created by declaration of trust, that in the case of such a trust created by
transfer the interest of the unascertained beneficiaries remains in the
settlor by way of resulting trust and he can sue the trustee to enforce
the trust. If the settlor can in such a case sue to enforce the trust, that
would be some indication that he does retain the contingent interests
by way of resulting trust. But. it is generally held that the settlor of a
trust, as such, has no right to sue the trustee to enforce the trust on either
a contract or a trust theory and that he is not a necessary party to a suit
to enforce the trust or construe thetrust instrument. 4 This appears to
be true even though some of the beneficiaries of the trust are unborn.95
explanation is that, even as late as 1639 it was a matter of debate between the serjeants at law
whether when a contingent remainder was preceded by two life estates in living persons, ultimate reversion or remainder in fee to the first life tenant, it could be destroyed by destruction
of the estate of the first life tenant as well as by destruction of that of the second. 2 ROLLE,
ABRuDGMENT 797, pl. 12 (1668). That it could not be so destroyed was not settled until the
decision in Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wins. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732). The third possible
explanation is less abstruse: the report of Sir Thomas Palmer's Case concludes with the following remark, "Mes nota que per sondry vehement psumpcons del forgery del dit fait le fait fuit
censure
& damne mes nul pson censure."
9
2 Attainder on appea of felony worked a forfeiture as of the date of the judgment. 1
Coim, 1 sTruTEs 390b, 1st Amer. ed., (1853). 'Squire Mantel was attained on an appeal
of felony. Rex v. Lord Dacres, Mantel, et al., Brook's New Cases, 48, 185, 73 Eng. Rep.
868, 928 (1542).
93 5 BACo N, NEw AnBRIGmENT or THE LAw 364, 3rd ed., (1770).
94 1 TnusTs RESTATEmNT, § 200, comment a (1935); see Culbertson v. Matson, 11
Mo. 493, 507 (1848) see Padelford v. Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co., 121 Pa. Super.
193, 183 A. 442 (1936); 2 Scorr, LAw ov TRusTs, §§ 197.2, 200.1 (1939); 1 BOGERT, LAw
op TRusTs ArN TRusTEEs, § 42 (1935); 2 Id., § 415. Cf. Abbott v. Gregory, 39 Mich. 68
(1878); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 680, 53 S.Ct. 761 (1933).
9
5 Levy v. Hart, 54 Barb. 248 (N.Y., 1869). It should be noted that, although the
heirs of a living person are unascertainable, they are not necessarily unborn. It would seem
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Moreover, joining the settlor as a party to an action concerning the trust
does not appear to bind unborn beneficiaries under the doctrine of virtual
representation if they are not otherwise bound.96
III
CONCLUSION

In sum, if a settlor who transfers property to a trustee upon trust for
unborn and unascertained persons retains the interest of the unborn and
unascertained persons by way of resulting trust the interest so retained
is remarkably insubstantial. It can never become possessory or beneficial
in the holder. It cannot be aliened by him and its retention by him will
not cause a previously valid trust to be destroyed by merger. It is not
forfeited when he is attainted. It cannot be made the basis of a suit or
defense at law or in equity. Such an interest is a pure fiction and its
absence should not be made the basis for striking down an otherwise
valid trust which would be upheld if it were present. It is submitted
that no such interest exists and that none is needed. There is no rule that
a trust must have at its inception some ascertainable living person capable
of suing the trustee to enforce it. It is sufficient if there will be such
beneficiaries within the period of the rule against perpetuities. The law
does not require that every future equitable interest have a presently
ascertainable owner or quasi-owner any more than it makes such a requirement as to future legal interests. 97 The suggestion that it does
that a presumptive heir has enough interest to sue to enforce a trust for the heirs of a living
person. Hunt v. Hunt, 124 Mich. 502 at 507, 83 N.W. 371 (1900). See Roberts v. Michigan
Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91 at 105, 262 N.W. 744 (1935). A trust for beneficiaries who are all
unborn, as distinct from unascertained, never provides for disposition upon all possible contingencies because there is a possibility that none of the beneficiaries will ever be born. The
creation of such a trust will, therefore, leave a reversionary interest in the settlor. When such
a trust is created by transfer an argument of some weight, based upon grounds of policy, could
be made for allowing the settlor to sue to enjoin threatened breaches of trust as well as to
protect his reversion. It does not necessarily follow from the admission of such a right to sue
that the settlor's reversion includes the interest of the unborn beneficiaries or that the settlor
is the owner of the interest of the unborn beneficiaries in any sense which would operate to
destroy or permit the destruction of that interest.
90 See 3 SIMES, FUTRE INTEREsTs, §§ 672, 685 (1936). In Wright v. Miller, 8 N.Y. 9,
59 Am. Dec. 438 (1853) an unmarried woman conveyed property to a trustee upon trust for

herself during her lifetime, then for her unborn children or if she should have none for the
children of her brother and if he should have none then for the trustee beneficially. The settlor married, had some children and joined her husband in conveying part of the property to
a third party, who secured a decree against the settlor, the trustee, and the settlor's husband
as guardian of her infant children declaring that he was a bona fide purchaser for value and
took free of the trust. The third party then conveyed to the settlor's husband. The settlor's
children, some of whom were born before the entry of the decree and some after, upon coming
of age, sued their father to reestablish the trust. The Court of Appeals granted their prayers.
97 1 Sco-rr, LAw oF TRusTs, § 112.1 (1939).

1949]

THE MORSMAN TRUST

931

involves a mechanical application of property concepts which would have
had no appeal to a fifteenth century lord high chancellor. His test of
the validity of a trust would have been, "Did the trustee bind his conscience?""S
The key problem in the Morsman case was raised squarely in the
celebrated case of Pibus v. Mitford." Michael Mitford, being seised in
fee simple of land and having a son Robert by his first wife and a son
Ralph by Jane, his second wife, covenanted to stand seised to the use of
his heirs male begotten, or to be begotten, on the body of Jane, his second
wife. Michael died and later Ralph died. A purchaser from Robert
brought ejectment against the son and heir of Ralph who, of course, had
no right to possession unless the covenant to stand seised was valid. The
Court of King's Bench gave judgment for the defendant, holding that
the covenant to stand seised was effective to change the use even though
it had no ascertainable beneficiary except the covenantor himself during
the life of Michael, the covenantor. ' Justice Wylde thought that the
08

Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 HnARv. L. Rv. 261 at 262, 274 (1908).
It has been unnecessary to rely upon a theory for enforcing charitable trusts since the
enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses (43 Eliz., c. 4, 1601) but no doubt the usually
accepted modern theory is that the beneficiary of such trusts is the public. It is quite probable that this was not the theory before the statute and that they were then enforced merely
on the theory that the conscience of the legal owner of the property was bound. See, e.g., the
case in 1 Calendar of the Proceedings in Chancery 56 (1827), where a man sued circa 1456
to enforce his mother's transfer to defendant upon trust to found a chantry. See also Wilmot,
C. J., in Atty-Gen. ex rel. Univ. of Cambridge v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1 at 32-33, 97 Eng.
Rep. 1 at 13 (1767). The theory that the public is the beneficiary of a charitable trust is
stretched to an extreme limit by application in a predominantly Protestant community to a
trust to have masses said in a monastery chapel for the souls of the testator and his deceased
wife and daughters. Minturn v. Conception Abbey, 227 Mo. App. 1179, 61 S.W. (2d) 352
(1933). The quasi-enforcement given to the so-called honorary trusts for support of animals,
upkeep of monuments, etc., cannot be explained by any theory of a benefiiciary in being
capable of suing to enforce the trust. E.g. Mussett v. Bingle, E1876] W.N. 170 (Ch. Div.,
1876); In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889). It is explicable on the basis that the next of kin's
consciences are bound by the expressed wishes of their ancestor.
001 Ventris 372, 86 Eng. Rep. 239; 3 Salk. 337, 91 Eng. Rep. 859; sub nom. Pybus v.
Mitford, I Freeman 351, 369, 89 Eng. Rep. 262, 275 (1673); 3 Keble 339, 84 Eng. Rep. 754
2 Lev. 75, 83 Eng. Rep. 456; 1 Mod. 98, 121,159, 86 Eng. Rep. 761, 780, 800; Raym. Sir T.,
228, 83 Eng. Rep. 119 (1674). The report in 1 Ventris is the most complete. Despite Lord St.
Leonard's statement in his note to GILBERT, UsEs AND TRusTs 35, 3rd ed., (1811) that "The
case of Pybus and Mitford has however been often denied, although the rule is now well settled," the case has been cited with approval in numerous later opinions. E.g., Penhay v. Hurrell, 2 Freem. 258, 22 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1702); Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Ves. Sen. 142, 153, 27
Eng. Rep. 944, 951 (1748); Adams v. Savage, 2 Ld. Raym. 854, 92 Eng. Rep. 71 (1703);
Clifton v. Jackson, 2 Vern. 486, 489, 23 Eng. Rep 912, 913 (1704); Newcomen v. Barkham,
2 Vern. 729, 735, 23 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1080 (1716); Marquis Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2
Jac. & W. 1, 107, 37 Eng. Rep. 527, 565 (1820); Thompson v. Gibson, 8 M. & W. 281, 288,
151 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047 (1841); Owen v. Gibbons, [1902) 1 Ch. 636, 638.
100 The decision in Pibus v. Mitford was presaged by Sammes' Case, 13 Co. Rep. 54, 56,
77 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1466 (1609) where it was said, by way of dictum:
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effect of the covenant was to give Michael a life use, use in remainder
to his heirs male by his second wife in tail. Justice Rainsford thought it
operated to give Michael himself an estate in special tail.'' Chief Justice Hale thought that the covenantor probably intended to create an
estate in special tail in himself but that the covenant would be valid on
either theory, the only criterion of its exact effect being the intention
expressed. All the justices appeared to think it possible for a man to covenant to stand seised to his own use for life,2 remainder to persons who
0
would not be ascertainable until his death.'
The problem arose again in Hayes v. Kershow.103 In that case
Thomas and James Swords had conveyed land to James Davidson and
Mrs. Anderson in fee simple to the use of their sister Mrs. Anderson for
life and after her death to the use of her children Allen and Mary for
their lives, use in reversion to the grantors. Thereafter Thomas and
James Swords covenanted, in consideration of love and affection for Mrs.
Anderson and her offspring and one dollar, to convey their reversion to
the lawful issue of Allen and Mary, if they should have lawful issue. Ten
years later Davidson, Mrs. Anderson and Allen executed a deed to
Thomas and James Swords, purporting to discharge them from their
covenant and agreeing to procure a like discharge from Mary when she
came of age. Thereafter Thomas and James Swords conveyed the land
to Mrs. Anderson bv bargain and sale in fee simple. When Mary came
of age she released her interest to Mrs. Anderson. Mrs. Anderson conveyed the land to Stephen Mayers. Allen died without issue. The question presented was whether Stephen Mayers had a marketable tide. It
"So if a man, seised of lands in fee-simple, by deed covenants with another, that
he and his heirs will stand seised of the same land, to the use of himself and the heirs
of his body, or unto the use of himself for life, the remainder over in fee; in that case,
by the operation of the statute [of Uses], the estate which he bath at the common
law is divested, and a new estate vested in himself, according to the limitation of the
use."
As to the weight to be given dicta in Sammes' Case, see GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUETIEs, § 930, note 1, 3rd ed., (1915).
101 This was the interpretation of the decision made in Hopkins v. Hopkins, I Atk. 581,
596, 26 Eng. Rep. 365, 374 (1738) and GILBERT, UsEs AND TnusTs 35, 3rd ed., (1811).
This interpretation does not make Pibus v. Mitford quite as strong a precedent on the problem
in the Morsman case because Michael's estate tail would be prevented from merging with his
fee simple by the Statute of Westminster II, supra, note 7.
102 Justice Twisden dissented on the ground that no one except the right heir (i.e.,
Robert) could take under a gift to "heirs", despite the clear expression in the instrument of an
intention that "heirs" should not mean right heirs. The other judges held that this arbitrary
old common law rule had no application to wills and instruments raising uses; that the intention of tie settlor should control and the context vary the usual meaning of "heirs."
103 1 Sandf. Ch. 258 (N.Y. Ch., 1844).
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was held that he did not because a contingent interest was outstanding
in the unborn children of Mary. The court thought that the covenant
could operate either as a covenant to stand seised or as a trust and that, in
either case, it created an indestructible interest in the unborn children of
Allen and Mary. These settlors were clearly the sole trustees and the
only presently ascertainable beneficiaries even if-we accept the view that
the interest of the unborn contingent beneficiaries remained in them
by way of resulting use or trust.'
Three years after it denied certiorari in the Morsman case, the United States Supreme Court declared that technical considerations of the
law of trusts and property should be disregarded in applying the federal
tax statutes.'0 5 This is unquestionably the lesser of two evils. Tax statutes come and go. If an omnivorous tax-gatherer cannot be appeased by
application of the fair meaning of the current statute to established legal
relationships it is better to distort the meaning of the statute than to
disturb settled rules of property. Congress can correct the tax statutes by
amendment. Unsettling the rules of property disturbs innumerable executed transactions, without possibility of redress. The rules of property
cannot even be restored prospectively without action by fifty legislatures.
The court which decided the Morsman case has since referred to it as
104 It might be argued that Hayes v. Kershow is not an incontrovertible denial of the
resulting trust theory advanced by the majority opinion in the Morsman case because a trust
with two trustees does not fail even though they are the sole beneficiaries. 1 TRusTs RESTATEMENT, § 99(4) and comment b (1935). The theory for supporting a trust in such cases is
that the trustees hold their legal estate as joint tenant and their beneficial interests as tenants
in common, thus preventing merger. That theory could not be applied to Hayes v. Kershow
because the trustees were tenants in common to begin with and did not purport to change
the nature of their retained legal estate by the covenant to convey. But see Horlick v. Sidley,
241 Wis. 81, 3 N.W. (2d) 710 (1942).
Another possible argument might be that, because the covenant recited a consideration
of one dollar it was a bargain and sale, which may have different effects than a covenant to
stand seised or declaration of trust. It was held very early, however, that an instrument which
recites both good (i.e., marriage; love and affection) and valuable consideration is a true
covenant to stand seised, not a bargain and sale. Calthrop's Case, Moore K.B. 101, 102, 72
Eng. Rep. 468 (1574). "... [Q]uia le marriage est le principal consideracon en le'entent des
pties, & 'argent nest que accessory que attend le marriage." This remark is certainly applicable to a pecuniary consideration of one dollar.
In Olympia Mining and Milling Co. v. Kerns, 24 Idaho 481, 135 P. 255 (1913) the
defendant in 1901 executed a declaration of trust of mining claims in favor of "a corporation
to be hereafter formed and to be named the Olympia Mining Company," conditional upon
the payment to him of certain money and issuance to him of stock. The defendant repudiated
the trust in 1904. The corporation was formed and sued in 1909, tendering the money and
stock, to enforce the trust. The suit was held to be barred by laches but the court indicated
that the trust would have been enforcible if the conditions had been performed and the suit

brought5 promptly.
10 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 at 334-335, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
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an example of the new Supreme Courf doctrine, thus conceding by implication that the Morsman decision did not truly reflect the law of
trusts. 10

6

It is submitted that, insofar as the majority opinion in Morsman v.
Commissioner'of Internal Revenue' " purports to declare the law of
trusts, it is unsound and ought not to be followed. The settlor of a private trust can be the sole trustee and the only presently ascertainable
beneficiary so long as the other beneficiaries will be ascertainable within
the period of the rule against perpetuities. John Stiles, while unmarried,
can declare himself trustee of South Sea shares for the benefit of himself
during his lifetime and of his unascertained widow and unborn children
after his death.
106 United States v. Pierce, (C.C.A., 8th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 428 at 431.
107

Supra, note 1.

